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Five cybersecurity incidents in Mexico and the profile each one exposed

Nov 3
3 min read

A cybersecurity incident leaves a cost and also a question: who was missing from the team? We review five public cases in Mexico: what happened, what the consequences were and which profile was exposed. In only one of them did the consequence become a rule that requires a role. In the others, what remained was the lesson.


1. SPEI, 2018: the one that changed the rules


Between April and May 2018, attackers targeted the systems that five participants (banks, brokerages and other institutions) used to connect to SPEI, Mexico's interbank payment system, not SPEI itself. According to Banxico (Mexico's central bank), about 300 million pesos left those participants' accounts. No customer accounts were touched.


Consequences:


  • The highest-risk participants were moved to a contingency platform and payments slowed down.

  • Banxico created a Cybersecurity Directorate and, in 2019, opened sanction proceedings against 18 institutions.

  • Under Circular 11/2018, every participant must appoint an information security officer, independent from IT and audit, appointed by the CEO and reported to Banxico.


Profile exposed: Information Security Officer. It is the only case on this list where the incident led to a requirement to have the role.


2. Pemex, 2019: the pending patches


In November 2019, ransomware hit Pemex, Mexico's state oil company. The company said fewer than 5% of its computers were affected and operations continued.


Consequences:


  • The press reported a ransom demand of about 4.9 million US dollars. The Ministry of Energy said it would not be paid.

  • Two weeks later, employees were still reporting problems with external email and some systems.

  • Mexico's Federal Audit Office (ASF) concluded that obsolete systems and unapplied patches contributed to the attack.


Profile exposed: Vulnerability Management and Incident Response.


3. Sedena, 2022: the warning that already existed


In September 2022, the group Guacamaya leaked documents from Sedena, Mexico's Ministry of Defense. The president acknowledged the attack and confirmed that the information published about his health was true.


Consequences:


  • Sensitive information about the Army and the president himself became public.

  • An earlier ASF audit had already pointed out weaknesses in cyber defense controls, including the lack of an incident response procedure and of penetration testing.

  • In December 2025, the General Cybersecurity Policy for the Federal Public Administration required every agency to have an Institutional Cybersecurity Officer, preferably separate from the head of IT. The document does not mention Sedena.


Profile exposed: Incident Response and Red Team (penetration testing).


4. Journalists' data, 2024: the access nobody closed


In January 2024, the personal data of 263 journalists accredited to the president's morning press conference was extracted. According to the government, the account used belonged to a former employee who had left two years earlier.


Consequences:


  • INAI, the data protection authority at the time, opened an investigation and required the affected people to be notified. The government notified them by email.

  • The Ministry of the Interior filed a complaint with the Attorney General's Office (FGR).


Profile exposed: Identity and Access Management (IAM). Revoking access when someone leaves seems basic. This case shows what happens when nobody checks.


5. Coppel, 2024: when operations stop


In April 2024, Coppel, a Mexican retail and financial services company, confirmed a security incident. Its online store and app went down.


Consequences:


  • Eleven days later, Afore Coppel (its pension fund manager) was still restoring customer service.

  • Coppel announced it would not charge late interest on payments that couldn't be made during the outage.

  • The company said it had found no evidence of data theft.


Profile exposed: Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery.


What they have in common


In three of the five cases, the cause was already there before the attack: unapplied patches, controls an audit had already flagged, an account nobody revoked. When hiring, it is worth asking what tools someone knows, and also what they were responsible for and what they reviewed.


Looking for any of these profiles? Tell us what you need at angelrossio@beethon.com


Angel Rossio Millán

IT Headhunter | Master's in Human Resources Management, EAE Business School Barcelona


Sources (in Spanish)

 
 
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